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LINDSEY V. NORMET:
A SUPREME COURT REFUSAL
TO FEDERALIZE OREGON'S
LANDLORD-TENANT PROCEDURE
In Lindsey v. Normet, month-to-month tenants refused to pay their
rent unless certain violations of a local housing code were remedied.
After the landlord threatened to evict them for nonpayment of rent,
the tenants filed a class action in federal court asking that the Oregon
Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute (FED)2 be declared
unconstitutional on its face.
The tenants' principal attack was against the limitation of triable
issues in the FED statute;3 the statute having precluded the raising of
other affirmative defenses, such as the landlord's failure to maintain
the premises, the property being in violation of the housing code or
the landlord's eviction of the tenants in retaliation for reporting hous-
ing code violations.4 Appellant-tenants claimed this limitation of
1. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
2. ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 105.105-.160 (Supp. 1971).
3. The tenants also attacked: (1) the requirement of the FED statute that the
trial be held no later than six days after service of the complaint unless security for
accruing rent was provided; and (2) the requirement of posting bond on appeal
in twice the amount of rent expected to accrue pending appellate decision, with a
complete forfeiture of this bond if the lower court decision is affirmed. The Su-
preme Court found that the six day trial requirement was not unconstitutional, but
the double bond requirement was found to be a violation of the equal protection
clause as discriminating against tenants who want to appeal and imposing an un-
fair burden on indigent tenants. 405 U.S. at 64.
4. The landlord need only prove: (1) a description of the premises; (2) that
the tenant is in possession; (3) that the tenant unlawfully holds the premises with
force; and (4) that the landlord is entitled to possession. ORE. R.Ev. STAT. §
105.125 (Supp. 1971). A tenant is considered unlawfully holding with force
"[wihen the tenant or person in possession of any premises fails or refuses to pay
rent within 10 days after it is due under the lease or agreement. . . ." Id. §
105.115. The verdict by the court or jury is limited to the truth of the landlord's
complaint. Id. §§ 105.145-.150. An issue apparently not raised by plaintiffs was
whether the rent was "due" under the FED statute. If an implied warranty of
habitability was accepted by Oregon courts, plaintiffs could argue that the rent
was not due because of the landlord's breach. Plaintiffs may have decided not to
argue this point because a federal court probably would not have interpreted the
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
defenses to be a denial of due process in that they were denied an
opportunity to present every available defense.5 They also argued
that the FED statute denied tenants equal protection of the laws by
"classifying tenants of real property differently from other tenants for
purposes of possessory actions.... ."6 Appelants claimed that the equal
protection standard should be stringently applied because of the
statute's effect on the "need for decent shelter" and the "right to
retain peaceful possession of one's home" 8-both of which should be
protected as "fundamental interests which are particularly important
to the poor and which may be trenched upon only after the State
demonstrates some superior interest."
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's holding that the
limitation of defenses did not violate the requirements of due process
or equal protection. In an opinion written by Justice White, the
majority held that the FED statute was a reflection of the common
law rule of independent covenants-that the tenant's covenant to pay
rent was not dependent upon any obligation of the landlord to main-
tain the premises. The Supreme Court refused to upset that long-
standing rule and, therefore, found that the Oregon courts did not
violate the tenant's right to due process by keeping the duties of the
landlord and tenant as separate triable issues and by prohibiting the
tenant from raising certain defenses to a landlord's action for posses-
sion.10 The Court also held that the FED statute did not violate the
tenants' equal protection rights because Oregon had an adequate
state interest in the quick settlement of disputes over the possession
of real property; thus, the limitation of triable issues was justified.1
Furthermore, the Court refused to apply the more stringent equal
protection standard since there is no constitutional right to adequate
housing, and the assurance of adequate housing is a legislative, not
judicial, function.' 2
state statute. Furthermore, plaintiffs' primary target seems to be the constitution-
ality of the common law doctrine of independent covenants in leases, not an inter-
pretation of the FED statute.
5. See, e.g., American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932).
6. 405 U.S. at 70.
7. Id. at 73.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 64-69.
11. Id. at 69-73.
12. Id. at 73-74.
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Historically, the lease has been considered a conveyance of land as
well as a contract. 13 Consequently, rent was considered a species of
realty and, absent an express covenant in the lease, the only duty of
the landlord was to provide for quiet enjoyment of the land by the
tenant.14 Furthermore, any other covenants expressed or implied in
the lease contract have usually been considered as independent cov-
enants, so that a breach by either party would not excuse the other
party from performance." This traditional view of leases puts the
urban tenant at a significant disadvantage:36 the tenant, bound by the
doctrine of caveat emptor; 7 the landlord, in the absence of an express
covenant, under no obligation to maintain the premises. 8 A breach
by the landlord of a covenant to repair was no defense to an action of
rent or eviction. 9
Recognizing this hardship on indigent urban tenants, courts and
legislatures have shown a definite trend toward liberalizing the strict
and antiquated laws of real property for the benefit of apartment
dwellers.2-0 An early departure from traditional landlord-tenant law
was the doctrine of constructive eviction whereby a substantial inter-
ference with possession or enjoyment which makes the leased property
13. 1 AMEICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
14. Id. § 3.47. The duty to provide "quiet enjoyment" is a restraint on the
landlord from interfering with the possessory rights of the tenant or allowing third
parties to take possession under a paramount title. Id. § 3.47-.49.
15. Id. § 3.11. This is unlike a breach of a material covenant in a bilateral con-
tract where, the covenants being mutually dependent, the other party is excused
from further performance. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, §§ 267, 274 (1932).
However, even if the covenants in a lease are construed as mutually dependent, a
breach by the landlord will not allow the tenant to retain possession of the leased
property without paying some rent; the tenant will still be responsible for any rent
which accrues while he retains possession, minus the damages from the landlord's
failure to meet his obligations under the lease contract. See Schoshinski, Remedies
of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519, 535-36 (1966).
16. The hardship of traditional favoritism toward the landlord in lease agree-
ments is especially severe for the indigent tenant who is faced with a shortage in
tenantable low-income housing. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT
Ho~xE 96 (1968).
17. Pittsley v. Acushnet Saw Mills Co., 299 Mass. 252, 12 N.E.2d 823 (1938).
18. Suydam v. Jackson, 54 N.Y. 450 (1873).
19. Mitchell v. Weiss, 26 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
20. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968); Pines v. Perssion,
14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961); Mo. Rav. STAT. §§ 441.500-.640
(1969).
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
untenantable excuses the tenant from the lease if he abandons the
premises within a reasonable time.21
Another remedy available to the tenant is an implied warranty of
habitability, whereby the traditional application of caveat emptor in
leases is rejected in favor of a contractual warranty of fitness for pur-
pose implied in the lease. 22 The leading case finding an implied
warranty of fitness in lease contracts is Javins v. First National Realty
Corp.,23 heavily relied on by Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion
in Lindsey.24 The Javins court ruled that violations of the housing
code provided tenants with a defense to an eviction based on non-
payment of rent. The court based its decision on an implied war-
ranty to maintain the premises in compliance with the housing code:
"by signing the lease the landlord has undertaken a continuing obli-
21. Auto Supply Co. v. Scene-in-Action Corp., 340 II. 196, 172 N.E. 35
(1930); Westland Housing Corp. v. Scott, 312 Mass. 375, 44 N.E.2d 959 (1942);
Gombo v. Martise, 44 Misc. 2d 239, 253 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. 1964); 1
AMERXCAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 13, at § 3.51. The requirement that the
tenant actually abandon the premises renders the remedy of constructive eviction
ineffectual for the indigent who cannot afford to find suitable housing. Schoshin-
ski, supra note 15, at 530. However, a few cases have found a constructive
eviction without abandonment. Charles B. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340
Mass. 124, 163 N.E.2d 4 (1959); Johnson v. Pemberton, 196 Misc. 739, 97
N.Y.S.2d 153 (New York Mun. Ct. 1950); Majen Realty Corp. v. Glotzer, 61
N.Y.S.2d 195 (New York Mun. Ct. 1946).
22. To utilize this doctrine, a court must first recognize that a lease is more like
a bilateral contract than a conveyance of land. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp.,
428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 463 P.2d 470
(1969); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969); Pines
v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). See also UNwVoRs CorA-
MERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314, -315; Jaeger, Warranty of Merchantability & Fitness for
Use, 16 RrauGERs L. REv. 493 (1962). The standards of fitness used by courts in
implying a warranty have been found in housing codes. See Whetzel v. Jess Fisher
Management Corp., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (duty to repair enforceable
in tort by private parties); Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C.
App. 1968) (voiding a lease known to be in violation of the housing code at the
commencement of the lease); Schiro v. W. E. Gould & Co., 18 Ill. 2d 538, 165
N.E.2d 286 (1960) (existing law should be implied in contract terms). Using this
doctrine, courts have found that housing code violations at the commencement of
a lease will render the lease void. Brown v. Southall, supra; Reste Realty Corp. v.
Cooper, supra; Morbeth Realty v. Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 2d 325, 323 N.Y.S.2d 363
(Civ. Ct. 1971); Pines v. Perssion, supra. Also, a few courts have found that fail-
ure to maintain the premises to the standards set by the housing codes may render
a lease voidable. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., supra; Kline v. Burns, 111
N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
23. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
24. 405 U.S. at 79 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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gation to the tenant to maintain the premises in accordance with all
applicable law."25
Although both cases were concerned with the issue whether a
landlord's violation of the housing code afforded tenants an affirma-
tive defense to an action for eviction for non-payment of rent, there
are important differences between Javins and Lindsey. First, Javins
was basically concerned with the interpretation of a lease, and the
remedy sought was contractual; Lindsey, on the other hand, was con-
cerned with the constitutional question "whether Oregon's judicial
procedure for eviction of tenants after nonpayment of rent violat[ed]
either the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."26 This difference is particularly important
in the Court's discussion in Lindsey of the relevance of medieval
property law to the modern lease, and whether there was a federal
question sufficient to allow the Court to evaluate Oregon's landlord-
tenant law. The Javins court, in speaking of the common law rule of
property, stated: "Courts have a duty to reappraise old doctrines in
the light of the facts and values of contemporary life-particularly old
common law doctrines which the courts themselves created and de-
veloped."27 Justice Wright, writing for the Javins court, stated that
the historical view of a lease as a conveyance is not relevant to leases
of urban dwellings, but that urban leases are closer to a purchase of
a package of goods28 which should be treated like any other contract.29
Since the only issue in Lindsey was the constitutionality of the FED
procedure, the Supreme Court, unlike the court in Javins, refused to
evaluate the merits of the eviction statute and throw out ancient pre-
cepts which seem to hold no relevance today. Thus, the Court
in Lindsey refused to federalize landlord-tenant law. Citing Grant
Timber & Manufacturing Co. v. Gray,30 a case which upheld the com-
25. 428 F.2d at 1081.
26. 405 U.S. at 58.
27. 428 F.2d at 1074.
28. "[A] package which includes not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate
heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and
doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance." Id.
29. Id. at 1074-75. Under this treatment, a lease, like any other contract, in-
cludes an implied warranty and dependent covenants.
30. 236 U.S. 133 (1915). This case upheld a Louisiana procedure that pro-
vided that a defendant sued in a possessory action could not bring an action to
establish title or present equitable claims until after the possessory suit was decided.
Thus, the tenant of real property, like the tenant in Lindsey, could not defend an
action for possession by using the breach of the landlord as an affirmative defense.
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mon law doctrine of independent covenants in the sale of real prop-
erty, the Court stated:
It would be a surprising extension of the Fourteenth Amendment
if it were held to prohibit the continuance of one of the most
universal and best known distinctions of the medieval law ...
But it is unnecessary to follow the speculations or to consider
whether the principle is eternal or a no longer useful survival.
The constitutionality of the law is independent of our views
upon such points.31
The Lindsey Court's refusal to federalize landlord-tenant law was
also based on the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins32 which
held that no federal general common law exists.33 Therefore, unless
the Court found a federal question or a constitutional violation, it
could not interfere with Oregon's substantive rental laws, regardless
of how antiquated they may be. As stated in Lindsey:
The Constitution has not federalized the substantive law of land-
lord-tenant relations, however, and we see nothing to forbid
Oregon from treating the undertakings of the tenant and those of
the landlord as independent rather than dependent covenants.3 '
Attempting to find a constitutional "handle" which would allow
the Court to evaluate the common law doctrine of independent cov-
enants, Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissenting opinion that the
right to complain to public officials is constitutionally protected.3
One of the affirmative defenses the tenants in Lindsey wished to raise
against the landlord's action for possession was that the landlord was
evicting the tenants in retaliation for reporting housing code viola-
tions.36 Justice Douglas claimed that the right to complain to public
officials concerning violations of the housing code is constitutionally
protected and, therefore, the Oregon courts' refusal to allow retalia-
tory eviction as a defense to a FED action was unconstitutional. 7
31. 405 U.S. at 68 n.14, citing Grant Timber & Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 236 U.S. 133,
134 (1915). See also Bianchi v. Morales, 262 U.S. 170 (1923).
32. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
33. Id. at 78.
34. 405 U.S. at 68.
35. Id. at 89 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532(1894).
36. 405 U.S. at 66 n.12.
37. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Dickhut v. Norton,
45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol1973/iss1/17
LANDLORD-TENANT PROCEDURE
However, the majority in Lindsey rejected this argument because the
tenants were estopped from claiming a retaliatory eviction since they
had not paid their rent. The Court said that to allow such a defense
without paying rent would constitute a taking from the landlord
without due process.3
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan suggested that the Court
could evaluate the constitutionality of the FED procedure, but only
after the Oregon courts redefined their position on landlord-tenant
law.: There are equitable defenses that are recognized by Oregon
courts in FED actions,40 but the majority stated that the defenses
sought to be raised by the appellants apparently were not among
those. However, Justice Brennan claimed that the Supreme Court had
no clear indication of whether Oregon courts would recognize the
substantive right of a tenant, based on the landlord's breach of duty,
to remain in possession while withholding rent.41 Justice Brennan felt
that if Oregon courts did recognize such an implied warranty of
habitability, the issue of the case would become:
[XV] hether Oregon would violate the Fourteenth Amendment
if its substantive law in some circumstances recognized tenants'
rights to withhold rent and retain possession based on the land-
lord's breach of duty to maintain the premises, but its procedural
law would not permit assertion of those rights in defense of an
FED action. 42
Justice Brennan, therefore, would advocate abstention by the district
court in order to avoid having a federal court dictate substantive law
to a state.4 3
To avoid having federal courts determine Oregon's substantive
landlord-tenant law, Justice Douglas suggested another version of the
issue in Lindsey:44 while it is not known whether Oregon accepts an
38. 405 U.S. at 67 n.13. The Court did not deal with the possibility of protect-
ing the landlord by putting accrued rent into an escrow account administered by
the court. See note 49 infra and accompanying text.
39. 405 U.S. at 90 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40. E.g., mental incompetence, forfeiture of the lease, reformation of the lease
and lessor's breach of a dependent covenant not to rent another part of the
premises to businesses in competition with the lessee's. Id. at 66 n.11.
41. Id. at 91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. Id. For abstention see Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
44. 405 U.S. at 89 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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implied warranty of habitability in leases,45 it is certain the Oregon
courts have construed a lease as being a contract; 4 perhaps, therefore,
the issue should be whether Oregon, since it has accepted that a lease
is a contract, can exclude common defenses in a contract action with-
out violating the tenants' rights of due process.47
While reviewing the constitutionality of the FED statute, the major-
ity in Lindsey concluded that the ends sought by the statute justified
the limitation of defenses against eviction. The purpose of the FED
statute is the peaceable and swift settlement of disputes between
landlord and tenant without resorting to the common law practice of
removing a delinquent tenant by force.48 Thus, the FED statute limits
defenses against eviction so that a landlord may obtain swift possession
of premises for which he is receiving no rent. However, the Court did
not deal with alternative procedural solutions which could provide
protection for the landlord and allow the tenant to raise defenses
against an eviction. One such solution, offered in Javins, would re-
quire the tenant to make rental payments into the registry of the court
as they became due during the period of time between the filing of
the eviction action and either the termination of the litigation or the
abandonment of the rental property by the tenant. 49
Lindsey should not affect any prior decisions holding either that a
warranty of habitability can be implied in a leases0 or that a tenant
45. Id.
46. Wright v. Baumann, 239 Ore. 140, 398 P.2d 410 (1965) (applying the
contractual principle of mitigation of damages to a commercial lease); Eggen v.
Wettorborg, 193 Ore. 145, 237 P.2d 970 (1951) (based on contractual principles,
destruction of a leased building by fire terminated the lease). However, these
cases are mere exceptions to the principle of independent covenants and do not
seem to adequately support Justice Douglas' statement that Oregon courts have
construed a lease as a contract.
47. Justice Douglas would find a violation of due process since he deems the
right of a tenant to claim his home to be fundamental. See 405 U.S. at 89 (dis-
senting opinion). However, under common law a lease is both a conveyance of
property and a contractual agreement. See 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra
note 13. It is therefore doubtful that the Supreme Court would find a violation of
due process merely because Oregon courts treat a lease as a contract in some ac-
tions, but not in others.
48. 405 U.S. at 71. For common law eviction under prior Oregon law see
Smith v. Reeder, 21 Ore. 541, 28 P. 890 (1892).
49. 428 F.2d at 1083 n.67.
50. See, e.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 463 P.2d 470 (1969); Reste
Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969); Pines v. Perssion,
14 Wis. 2d 490, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
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should be allowed to raise violations of the housing code as a defense
to eviction actions based on non-payment of rent.5 1 However, Lindsey
represents a strong statement that federal courts will not federalize a
state's landlord-tenant law-even when there are compelling arguments
that the state is perpetuating antiquated rules of real property which
have no modern basis.- z Also, the Supreme Court's dicta will probably
persuade courts to reject many equal protection arguments that would
favor indigent urban dwellers. The tenants in Lindsey argued that
the equal protection standard should be applied more strictly in
landlord-tenant cases because the right to peaceful possession and the
need for shelter of indigents is fundamental.5s The Supreme Court
rejected this argument by saying that the right to adequate housing
does not fall into the category of fundamental interests which have
been vigorously protected by the courts: "the Constitution does not
provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are
unable to perceive .. any constitutional guarantee of access to dwell-
ings of a particular quality .. "5
Lindsey does not prohibit any state from finding that the landlord's
failure to maintain the leased premises in accordance with the hous-
ing code is a defense against an action of eviction brought by the
landlord for non-payment of rent. Lindsey only held that the right to
such a defense is not constitutionally guaranteed. Thus, it is unclear
what will happen to the tenants in Lindsey and other tenants in simi-
lar circumstances. The tenants could still argue in state court that
the rent has not come due because of the landlord's breach of an im-
plied warranty to maintain in accordance with the housing code.55
Also, the tenants might tender rent which has accrued and ask the
court to offset this amount by the damages attributable to the land-
lord's failure to maintain. Another argument which might be used by
the tenants is that they are being evicted in retaliation for reporting
violations of the housing code.5
However, it is most likely that Oregon and other state courts will
not accept these arguments. The dicta in Lindsey will probably be
51. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
52. See notes 30 & 31 supra and accompanying text.
53. 405 U.S. at 73.
54. Id. at 74.
55. See note 4 supra.
56. See notes 35-38 supra and accompanying text.
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persuasive in encouraging courts to defer these questions to the legis-
latures. "Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate
housing and the definition of the landlord-tenant relationships are
legislative, not judicial, function."'57
This leaves the indigent tenant in a difficult situation: he cannot
afford to move from substandard housing, withhold rent and remain
in possession, or report violations of the housing code for fear of being
evicted in retaliation by the landlord. Since Lindsey has found that
such a scheme is not unconstitutional, the indigent tenants' only real
relief can come from the state legislatures. Surely, the state legisla-
tures, in the interest of providing adequate housing and the enforce-
ment of housing codes, must answer the challenge presented by
Lindsey.
Joseph D. Lehrer
57. 405 U.S. at 74.
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